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ABSTRACT 
Many articles have been written on the Armenian Genocide, both in the context of 
how to obtain Turkish recognition and how to obtain monetary relief in the courts of 
the United States. This Article summarizes the issues with the Movsesian III holding 
with regards to lack of precedent and the Ninth Circuit’s failure to follow the 
Supreme Court’s trend of limiting preemption. This Article then analyzes related 
decisions from four other circuits, demonstrating a clear circuit split on judicial 
understanding of the 5-4 Supreme Court ruling in Garamendi. This Article provides 
a roadmap to a friendly forum for victims of the Armenian Genocide, or victims of 
any other similar foreign tragedy, who seek redress in the American judicial system. 
By focusing their efforts on litigating and passing legislation in these friendly 
circuits, individuals seeking justice may realize better results than the victims and 
plaintiffs in the Movsesian line of cases.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: TWO GENOCIDES, TWO RESULTS 
uch has been written about the Holocaust-era litigation.1 The 
idea that foreign governments and business entities could be 
held accountable for their criminal actions perpetrated overseas was 
itself a novel one.2 Furthermore, the time elapsed from the crimes 
committed to the time of the litigation posed a significant problem.3 
Overall, the Holocaust-era litigation has been extremely successful in 
both a monetary sense as well as from a public relations standpoint.4 
The German government and German companies were forced to 
acknowledge and deal with the severe repercussions of their actions.5 
They were also compelled to pay significant sums of money in 
restitution and remuneration.6 For the Armenian descendants of the 
World War I era Armenian Genocide victims, the Holocaust era 
victories posed a wonderful working model of how to finally gain 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, From “Lamentation and Liturgy to Litigation”: 
The Holocaust-Era Restitution Movement as a Model for Bringing Armenian 
Genocide-Era Restitution Suits in American Courts, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 245, 245 
(2011). 
2 Id. at 247-48. 
3 See id. at 249; see also Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining how “[o]n this record, given the passage of 
time, the validity of the transfer ‘is not clear-cut.’”); see also Jennifer Anglim 
Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and Holocaust-Era Claims: 
Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for the Public 
Trust?, 88 OR. L. REV. 37, 49-50 (2009) (explaining how sorting the legitimate 
transaction from the illegitimate sixty or seventy years later can be extremely 
difficult: “Much art was Aryanized, or subjected to forced sales for prices 
significantly below market value (if any value ever actually materialized for the 
seller), and some art was sold at infamous ‘Jew auctions,’ which are now 
universally recognized as illegal. But some sales before April 26, 1938, were 
legitimate and for fair market value or close thereto. Some people were able to 
voluntarily sell art on the open market, albeit not much modern art after Hitler 
declared it ‘degenerate’. Additionally, because so many Jews were compelled to 
forfeit ‘flight asset[s]’ to pay for their passage out of the Reich, the European art 
market reflected depressed prices.”). 
4 See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 248-49; see also Gross v. German Found. Indus. 
Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2006). 
5 See Bazyler, supra note 1, at 248-49. 
6 See Vartges Saroyan, A Lesson from the Holocaust Restitution Movement for 
Armenians: Generate Momentum to Secure Restitution, 13 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 285, 286 (2011). 
M
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some long overdue compensation for the crimes committed against 
them.7 
There remains one important difference between these similar and 
often compared genocides. While Germany and the German nationals 
were openly apologetic for their crimes, Turkey adopted a shell of 
complete and utter denial.8 Much has been written about the audacity 
and perhaps sheer genius of Turkey’s tactic of wholly rejecting 
responsibility for the genocide of over one million Armenian men, 
women, and children.9 In fact, Turkey has actively endeavored to 
uproot this genocide from its national consciousness by essentially 
rewriting history in its educational system and international image.10 
Countries that openly acknowledge and dare to condemn the Armenian 
Genocide can expect fierce diplomatic retaliations from Turkey.11 
                                                            
7 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sarig Armenian & David McClure, Stoney Road Out of 
Eden: The Struggle to Recover Insurance for Armenian Genocide Deaths and Its 
Implications for the Future of State Authority, Contract Rights, and Human 
Rights, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 41-42 (2012) (detailing both the history 
of the Armenian Genocide as well as the attempted litigation); see also Stan 
Goldman, Is It Nobody’s Business but the Turks’?: Recognizing Genocide, 16 
TOURO INT’L L. REV. 25, 25 (2013); see also H.R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. (2000) 
(“The Armenian Genocide was conceived and carried out by the Ottoman 
Empire from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000 
Armenians, of whom 1,500,000 men, women, and children were killed, 500,000 
survivors were expelled from their homes, and which succeeded in the 
elimination of the over 2,500-year presence of Armenians in their historic 
homeland.”). 
8 See Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 
2013); see also Tim Arango, A Century After Armenian Genocide, Turkey’s 
Denial Only Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 16, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/europe/turkeys-century-of-denial-
about-an-armenian-genocide.html [https://perma.cc/LCN7-S9TP]. 
9 See Saroyan, supra note 6, at 298. 
10 See generally Richard G. Hovannisian, Denial of the Armenian Genocide in 
Comparison with Holocaust Denial, in REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL: THE CASE 
OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 201, 201-05 (1999). 
11 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2012) [hereinafter Movsesian III] (explaining how California’s “insurance” law 
affects foreign policy, and is thus preempted: “The passage of nearly a century 
since the events in question has not extinguished the potential effect of section 
354.4 on foreign affairs. On the contrary, Turkey expresses great concern over 
the issue, which continues to be a hotly contested matter of foreign policy 
around the world. See, e.g., Turkey retaliates over French ‘genocide’ bill, [sic] 
BBC, Dec. 22, 2011 (reporting that the Turkish prime minister announced 
measures against France after the French National Assembly passed a bill 
criminalizing denial of the ‘Armenian Genocide’); Peter Baker, Obama Marks 
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The Turkish denial of what is widely considered fact is not only 
insulting, but has also proved to be the ruination of the ill-fated 
Movsesian litigation, on which this Article focuses. While about forty 
of the states have officially recognized the genocide, it has been the 
long-standing executive policy to remain neutral about the issue.12 On 
three occasions, the House and Senate attempted to pass concurrent 
legislation officially recognizing the Armenian Genocide, and each 
time their actions were thwarted by the Executive Branch.13 This long-
standing policy of executive ambivalence stems from Turkey’s critical 
status as an ally and its strategic location as a staging ground for 
American military action abroad, especially in the Middle East.14 
California sought to make an end run around the U.S. executive 
indifference through legislation by enacting § 354.4, entitled 
“Armenian Genocide victims; insurance policy claims; waiver of 
statute of limitations.”15 This law basically suspended the statute of 
                                                                                                                                            
Genocide Without Saying the Word, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2010, at A10 (noting 
that President Obama was careful to avoid using the word ‘genocide’ during a 
commemorative speech in an attempt to ‘avoid alienating Turkey, a NATO ally, 
which adamantly rejects the genocide label.’”); see also Movsesian v. Victoria 
Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Movsesian 
I] (noting how “[o]n December 4, 2008, our court received a letter from 
the Turkish Ambassador via facsimile. Letter from Nabi Sensoy, the Turkish 
Republic’s Ambassador to the United States, to Molly Dwyer, Clerk of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (December 4, 2008). The 
letter expresses Turkey’s opposition to § 354.4, and urges the court to overturn 
the California statute.”). This case came before the Ninth Circuit three times 
with three different results and is referred to throughout the Article as Movsesian 
I, Movsesian II, and Movsesian III for clarity. 
12 See Movsesisan III, 670 F.3d at 1077; see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055. 
13 See Movsesisan III, 670 F.3d at 1077; see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055. 
14 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077; see also Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1057-58. 
15 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2011). The statute reads: “(a) The 
following definitions govern the construction of this section: 
 (1) ‘Armenian Genocide victim’ means any person of Armenian or other 
ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the period of 1915 to 1923, 
inclusive, who died, was deported, or escaped to avoid persecution during that 
period. 
 (2) ‘Insurer’ means an insurance provider doing business in the state, or whose 
contacts in the state satisfy the constitutional requirements for jurisdiction, that 
sold life, property, liability, health, annuities, dowry, educational, casualty, or 
any other insurance covering persons or property to persons in Europe or Asia at 
any time between 1875 and 1923. 
 (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Armenian Genocide victim, 
or heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, who resides in this state 
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limitations for all claims arising from Armenian Genocide victims’ 
insurance litigation in the State of California.16 The specifics of the 
court’s holding are discussed at length below. Briefly stated, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the executive expression of displeasure in any 
official U.S. recognition of the genocide was grounds for federal 
preemption.17 Thus, § 354.4 was deemed unconstitutional. 
This Article will take a respectful, yet highly critical look at the 
Ninth Circuit holding in Movsesian III.18 This Article will analyze the 
cases cited by the Ninth Circuit and explain why they do not truly 
support the wide contention of federal field preemption through mere 
executive expression of displeasure of a state law.19 This Article will 
also show how the general direction of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has been shifting away from the wide federal field preemption 
exhibited in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi20 and limiting 
federal preemption in the foreign affairs arena to narrow 
circumstances.21 This Article will then show how other Circuits’ 
decisions have reflected both a more tempered understanding of 
Garamendi as well as an understanding of how the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Medellin severely limits Garamendi.22 
Finally, this Article will suggest a possible road forward for the 
Armenian litigants in two ways. The first road has California, a state 
that has consistently shown interest in the matter, redraft § 354.4, 
                                                                                                                                            
and has a claim arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased or in 
effect in Europe or Asia between 1875 and 1923 from an insurer described in 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), may bring a legal action or may continue a 
pending legal action to recover on that claim in any court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state, which court shall be deemed the proper forum for that 
action until its completion or resolution. 
 (c) Any action, including any pending action brought by an Armenian Genocide 
victim or the heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, whether a 
resident or nonresident of this state, seeking benefits under the insurance 
policies issued or in effect between 1875 and 1923 shall not be dismissed for 
failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is 
filed on or before December 31, 2016.” 
16 See id. 
17 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1075-77. 
18 See generally id.; see infra Part II. 
19 See infra Section III.A. 
20 See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396(2003). 
21 See Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759 (2008); see also infra Sections III.B, 
III.A.1; see also infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra Part IV. 
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leaving out the “offensive” term of “Armenian Genocide.” In forcing 
the court to rehear this case, the Armenian litigants may be able to 
force the issue to the Supreme Court while the current trend of case 
law suggests a better outcome. The second road seeks to have other 
states such as New York or Pennsylvania, each the home of a 
significant number of Armenian Genocide descendants, draft 
legislation similar to California’s § 354.4. New York is in the Second 
Circuit and Pennsylvania the Third Circuit, and both have expressed a 
more leveled approach to foreign affairs preemption, which may very 
well translate into a more favorable legal outcome on the same set of 
facts. 
II. THE WINDING TAPESTRY THAT MAKES UP THE MOVSESIAN 
LITIGATION 
The procedural history of this case is unique in that there are three 
separate rulings by the circuit court, which this Article will reference 
as Movsesian I,23 Movsesian II,24 and Movsesian III.25 The same three-
justices decided Movsesian I and II; however, on a petition for 
rehearing that resulted in Movsesian II, Justice Nelson changed her 
vote.26 Defendants were then granted their petition for an en banc 
rehearing and the court reversed Movsesian II. While the holdings in 
Movsesian I and Movsesian III have the same outcome, that § 354.4’s 
waiving of the statute of limitations for Armenian Genocide victims 
was preempted by federal policy and therefore unconstitutional, there 
are significant variances in their rationales. These differences have a 
profound outcome in both the soundness of the Movsesian III holding 
as well as on the future of potential Armenian Genocide-related 
litigation. 
                                                            
23 See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 
1052, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
24 See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901, 901 (9th 
Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Movsesian II]. 
25 See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 
F.3d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). 
26 See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 903 (“Judge Pregerson and Judge Nelson vote to 
grant the petition for rehearing and Judge Thompson votes to deny the petition 
for rehearing. The petition for rehearing is GRANTED. The opinion and dissent 
filed on August 20, 2009, are hereby withdrawn. The opinion and dissent 
attached to this order are hereby filed.”). 
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This Section will outline and explain the three Movsesian 
decisions, closely looking at all three and tracking the differences 
between Movsesian I and Movsesian III. This Section will then take a 
critical look specifically at the Movsesian III holding. 
A. Origins of Movsesian 
Movsesian I arose out of a lawsuit by descendants of victims of the 
Armenian Genocide against Munich Re, the sixth largest insurance 
company and the largest reinsurance company in the world.27 The 
Munich Re litigation was not the first attempt by Armenian litigants - 
it was preceded by a similar complaint against New York Life.28 In 
New York Life, the litigants proceeded to engage in procedural 
skirmishes on the issues of forum selection and statute of limitations. 
This jousting eventually resulted in California passing § 354.4, which 
expressly extended the statute of limitations for Armenian litigants 
against insurance companies.29 Concurrently, the plaintiffs introduced 
a public relations aspect taking on a high-profiled attorney, which 
garnered significant media coverage.30 
The District Court’s decision in Marootian v. New York Life Ins. 
Co.31 eventually was the impetus for New York Life to settle.32 The 
Court held that § 354.4 was not unconstitutional and that the forum 
selection clauses were unfair and therefore not enforceable.33 On 
January 28, 2004, the two sides settled for $20 million.34 Perhaps 
bolstered by the success against New York Life, the plaintiffs in 
Movsesian I attempted to go after the larger Munich Re. Munich Re, 
however, did not yield to the social pressure and, while fully admitting 
to the fact that they did have insurance policies for Armenian 
                                                            
27 See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 55 (detailing with great 
specificity the history of the Movsesian litigation). 
28 See Complaint, Marootian v. New York Life Ins. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, 
Docket # 4, (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 18, 2000). 
29 Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 56. 
30 Id. at 52. 
31 See Marootian v. N.Y. Life Ins., Case No. CV-99-12073 CAS (MCx), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22274, at *53-54 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001). 
32 See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 64-65. 
33 See Marootian, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22274, at 53-54. 
34 Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 54. 
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Genocide victims, steadfastly claimed that the policies were time-
barred and § 354.4 was preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine.35 
B. Movsesian I 
Munich Re refiled a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which 
was partially denied. The pertinent part of the District Court holding 
was that § 354.4 was not preempted by the foreign affairs doctrine.36 
Munich Re then refiled an interlocutory appeal that resulted in 
Movsesian I. The three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit decided on 
only one issue, concluding that, “[section] 354.4 impermissibly 
infringes on the Federal Government’s foreign affairs power and is 
preempted.”37 This subsection will now analyze how the court reached 
this decision. 
Even before beginning its analysis, the court pointed out how the 
legislative findings accompanying § 354.4 condemned as the 
“Armenian Genocide” the violence suffered by the Armenians during 
the years of 1915-1923 by the Turks.38 The court then launched into a 
three-part analysis to find the statute preempted, first finding that there 
is an express federal policy against the legislative recognition of an 
Armenian Genocide.39 Second, the court found that § 354.4 clearly 
conflicted with this express federal policy.40 Third, the court examined 
the state’s interest in the litigation and decided that, on balance, the 
state’s interest was superficial compared to the government’s.41 
The express federal policy enunciated by the court was embodied 
in an amalgam of statements and letters from three different 
Presidents. The court noted how on three different occasions the 
House of Representatives attempted to pass resolutions recognizing the 
                                                            
35 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052, 
1055 (9th Cir. 2009). 
36 See id. at 1055. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. at 1054 (“In the legislative findings accompanying the statute, the 
Legislature provides formal recognition to an ‘Armenian Genocide’: The 
Legislature recognizes that during the period from 1915 to 1923, many persons 
of Armenian ancestry residing in the historic Armenian homeland then situated 
in the Ottoman Empire were victims of massacre, torture, starvation, death 
marches, and exile. This period is known as the Armenian Genocide.”) (citations 
omitted). 
39 See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
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Armenian Genocide and thrice the then-Executive expressed extreme 
displeasure at the idea.42 House Resolution 596 was proposed in 2000, 
which “called upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of 
the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity 
concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and 
genocide documented in the United States record relating to the 
Armenian Genocide, and for other purposes.”43 President Bill Clinton 
subsequently wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House expressing 
concern about the possible ramifications to Turkish-American Middle 
East military cooperation.44 Moreover, Clinton urged the Speaker to 
not bring the Resolution to the floor at that time.45 The second attempt, 
House Resolution 193, was met with similar resistance from President 
Bush in 2003, who wrote that such a resolution would only hamper the 
peace process between Armenia and Turkey.46 
Finally, House Resolution 106 was proposed in 2007 and the Bush 
Administration renewed its opposition to such a measure.47 The 
Administration expressed displeasure through letters from both the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.48 President Bush also 
released a statement explaining that, while “[w]e all deeply regret the 
tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915 [. . . t]his 
resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings, and 
its passage would do great harm to our relations with a key ally in 
NATO and in the global war on terror.”49 
                                                            
42 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052, 1057-60 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
43 See id. at 1057. 
44 See id. (discussing a letter from President Clinton, which explains, “[I] am 
deeply concerned that consideration of H. Res. 596 at this time could have far-
reaching negative consequences for the United States. We have significant 
interests in this troubled region of the world: containing the threat posed by 
Saddam Hussein; working for peace and stability in the Middle East and Central 
Asia; stabilizing the Balkans; and developing new sources of energy. 
Consideration of the resolution at this sensitive time will not only negatively 
affect those interests, but could undermine efforts to encourage improved 
relations between Armenia and Turkey-the very goal the Resolution’s sponsors 
seek to advance.”). 
45 Id. at 1057. 
46 Id. at 1059. 
47 Id. at 1058-59. 
48 Id. at 1057-58. 
49 Id. at 1059. 
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The court relied heavily upon American Insurance Ass’n v. 
Garamendi50 to prove its contention that executive preemption can 
                                                            
50 See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 396-97 (2003). Garamendi is a 
Supreme Court holding coming out of the Ninth Circuit that applies a broad 
application of express federal preemption. While the exact framework used is 
discussed below and was applied differently in Movsesian I and Movsesian III, 
the basic facts are as follows: “The Nazi Government of Germany confiscated 
the value or proceeds of many Jewish life insurance policies issued before and 
during the Second World War. After the war, even a policy that had escaped 
confiscation was likely to be dishonored, whether because insurers denied its 
existence or claimed it had lapsed from unpaid premiums, or because the 
German Government would not provide heirs with documentation of the 
policyholder’s death. These confiscations and frustrations of claims fell within 
the subject of reparations, which became a principal object of Allied diplomacy 
after the war. Ultimately, the western Allies placed the obligation to provide 
restitution to victims of Nazi persecution on the new West German Government, 
which enacted restitution laws and signed agreements with other countries for 
the compensation of their nationals. Despite a payout of more than 100 billion 
deutsch marks as of 2000, however, these measures left out many claimants and 
certain types of claims. After German reunification, class actions for restitution 
poured into United States courts against companies doing business in Germany 
during the Nazi era. Protests by defendant companies and their governments 
prompted the United States Government to take action to try to resolve the 
matter. Negotiations at the national level produced the German Foundation 
Agreement, in which Germany agreed to establish a foundation funded with 10 
billion deutsch marks contributed equally by the German Government and 
German companies to compensate the companies’ victims during the Nazi era. 
The President agreed that whenever a German company was sued on a 
Holocaust-era claim in an American court, the Government would (1) submit a 
statement that it would be in this country’s foreign policy interests for the 
foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for such claims, and (2) try to 
get state and local governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive 
mechanism. As for insurance claims in particular, both countries agreed that the 
German Foundation would work with the International Commission on 
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), a voluntary organization whose 
mission is to negotiate with European insurers to provide information about and 
settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and which has set up procedures to that 
end. The German agreement has served as a model for similar agreements with 
Austria and France. 
  Meanwhile, California began its own enquiry into the issue, prompting state 
legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insurers. Among other laws, 
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA) requires 
any insurer doing business in the State to disclose information about all policies 
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company or any one “related” to 
it upon penalty of loss of its state business license. After HVIRA was enacted, 
the State issued administrative subpoenas against several subsidiaries of 
European insurance companies participating in the ICHEIC. Immediately, the 
Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would damage 
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occur even without a federal law or treaty expressly dealing with the 
issue.51 The court noted how “[t]he Garamendi Court relied on similar 
communications between the [Bush] Administration and state 
legislative and executive officials, in addition to several executive 
agreements, in finding that HVIRA [Holocaust Victim Insurance 
Relief Act] was preempted.”52 The court then infused a little bit of the 
famous Youngstown53 framework and explained that Congress’s 
acquiescence to the Executive’s request to not legislatively recognize 
the Armenian Genocide gave the Executive even more power.54 
However, the main takeaway of the first prong of analysis was that 
there existed an “express federal policy prohibiting legislative 
recognition of an ‘Armenian Genocide,’ as embodied in the previously 
mentioned statements and letters of the President and other high-
ranking executive branch officials.”55 
The second prong of the Ninth Circuit’s framework found that the 
California law was in “clear conflict” with the express federal policy.56 
The court looked at the legislative findings, which condemned the 
Turks for the massacre, torture, and exile of the Armenian nationals 
during the Armenian Genocide.57 The court specifically fixated on the 
label “Armenian Genocide,” as this term remains highly offensive to 
                                                                                                                                            
the ICHEIC, the only effective means to process quickly and completely unpaid 
Holocaust era insurance claims, and that HVIRA would possibly derail the 
German Foundation Agreement. Nevertheless, the state insurance commissioner 
announced that he would enforce HVIRA to its fullest. Petitioner insurance 
entities then filed this suit challenging HVIRA’s constitutionality. The District 
Court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA and later 
granted petitioners summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
holding, inter alia, that HVIRA did not violate the federal foreign affairs 
power.” The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit and held that 
California’s HVIRA was unconstitutionally preempted by the express federal 
policy on the matter. Id. 
51 Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059-60. 
52 See id. at 1059. 
53 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579(1952). 
54 See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059. 
55 See id. (discussing Medellin and limiting its holding to states having a wider 
right to pass criminal statutes and thus less likely to be preempted by federal 
criminal law). 
56 Id. at 1060. 
57 Id. 
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Turkey and caused the statute to be in clear conflict with federal policy 
against recognition.58 
Finally, in its third prong of analysis, the Ninth Circuit weighed the 
state’s interest against the federal interest.59 The court explained that 
laws governing the statute of limitations are, generally speaking, 
“within the state’s traditional area of competence.”60 However, the 
court ultimately found California’s interest to be “superficial” because 
the true goal of § 354.4 “[wa]s to provide a forum for the victims of 
the ‘Armenian Genocide’ and their heirs to seek justice.”61 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that “California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4 is 
preempted because it directly conflicts with the executive branch’s 
foreign policy refusing to provide official recognition to the 
‘Armenian Genocide.’ Far from concerning an area of traditional state 
interest, § 354.4 impinges upon the National Government’s ability to 
conduct foreign affairs.”62 
C. Movsesian II 
Just over a year after Movsesian I was decided, a petition to rehear 
was granted and the Ninth Circuit made a stunning reversal, finding 
that § 354.4 was constitutional.63 The Movsesian II panel framed a 
very narrow issue, “whether § 354.4 conflicts with a clear, express 
federal executive policy,” and held that it did not.64 In its holding, the 
                                                            
58 Id. at 1060-61 (explaining how “Movsesian ridicules the idea that two words 
could have such a ‘talismanic’ effect. The symbolic effect of the words, 
however, is precisely the problem. The federal government has made a 
conscious decision not to apply the politically charged label of ‘genocide’ to the 
deaths of these Armenians during World War I. Whether or not California 
agrees with this decision, it may not contradict it.”). The court found that “[t]he 
Bush Administration warned that American recognition of an ‘Armenian 
Genocide’ could endanger America’s alliance with Turkey.” Id. at 1061. While 
Movsesian I seems to grapple with the idea that the mere words “Armenian 
Genocide” would invalidate a statute, the court found some solace in a letter 
from Condoleezza Rice. 
59 Id. at 1062-63. 
60 Id. at 1062. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1063. 
63 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian II) 629 F.3d 901, 909 (9th 
Cir. 2010).  
64 See id. at 903. 
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court found that there was no express federal policy restricting 
legislative recognition of the Armenian Genocide.65 
The Movsesian II Court, unlike Movsesian I’s three-part analysis, 
did not have a clear framework, but did make two distinct points 
relating to federal preemption. The first point asserted that there was 
no conflict preemption because any expression by the executive 
against legislative recognition of the Armenian Genocide was 
counterbalanced by many statements in support of such recognition.66 
The second point further asserted that there was no field preemption 
because California was regulating statute of limitations on insurance 
claims and not explicitly legislating foreign affairs.67 
As for conflict preemption, the court held that Garamendi was 
limited to executive agreements and not applicable to this case where 
there was no clear expression of an executive policy.68 In Garamendi 
“the [Supreme] Court found that several executive agreements, 
coupled with statements from executive branch officials, constituted 
an express federal policy.”69 By contrast, in Movsesian I, no such 
executive agreement existed. The executive expression of policy was 
merely deduced through informal letters, memoranda, and press 
releases.70 This court held that these did not constitute enough of an 
executive expression to create a foreign policy with preemptive 
implications.71 
Furthermore, the court examined how, for all the informal 
executive criticism against legislative recognition as evidenced by the 
executive impeding the passage of House Resolutions 193, 596, and 
106, there were also numerous statements in support of recognition of 
the Armenian Genocide.72 For example, “[i]n 1984, the House 
similarly recognized ‘victims of genocide, especially the one and one-
                                                            
65 See id. at 905. (holding that “neither the Claims Agreement nor the War Claims 
Act, which resolved World War I-related claims between the United States and 
Germany, has any application to life insurance policies issued to citizens of the 
Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1923.”). However, this Article is focused on 
the foreign affairs preemption part of the holding. 
66 See infra text accompanying notes 68-75. 
67 See also infra text accompanying notes 68-75. 




72 Id. at 906-07. 
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half million people of Armenian ancestry.’”73 Additionally, the 
Executive Branch has repeatedly used terms virtually indistinguishable 
from “Armenian Genocide.” For example, more recently, “President 
Obama publicly remembered the 1.5 million Armenians who were [ ] 
massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Meds Yeghern must live on in our memories, just as it 
lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people.”74 These executive 
expressions counterbalance, and potentially outweigh, the various 
informal executive statements against recognition of the Armenian 
Genocide.75 
As for field preemption, the Ninth Circuit in Movsesian II applied 
a generous Garamendi standard, finding that “field preemption would 
only apply if a ‘state were simply to take a position on a matter of 
foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state 
responsibility.’”76 It held that California was well within the traditional 
realm of state interests and that § 354.4 was a proper state regulation 
of insurance companies.77 The court was unbothered by the fact that 
Armenian Genocide victims were receiving preferential legislation, 
holding that any foreign affairs implications were “at most . . . 
incidental . . . particularly considering that thirty-nine other states 
already officially recognize the Armenian Genocide.”78 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the “California Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 354.4 is not preempted by federal law. There is no clearly 
established, express federal policy forbidding state references to the 
Armenian Genocide. California’s effort to regulate the insurance 
industry is well within the realm of its traditional interests.”79 
                                                            
73 Id. (quoting H.J. Res. 247, 98th Congress (1984)). 
74 See id. at 907 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 
75 See id. (“Considering the number of expressions of federal executive and 
legislative support for recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and federal 
inaction in the face of explicit state support for such recognition, we cannot 
conclude that a clear, express federal policy forbids the state of California from 
using the term ‘Armenian Genocide.’”). 
76 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
77 Id. at 907-08. 
78 Id. at 908. 
79 Id. at 909. 
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D. Movsesian III 
On a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit once again reversed and 
held § 354.4 unconstitutional as preempted by federal law.80 While the 
holdings in Movsesian I and Movsesian III both struck down § 354.4, 
the reasoning behind Movsesian III involves a much broader 
application of field preemption.81 It is perhaps the widest application 
of such preemption and is virtually without precedent. The court’s 
holding relies principally on two major field preemption cases, 
Zschernig v. Miller82 and American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.83 
In American Insurance, the Supreme Court first briefly explained 
how foreign affairs preemption encompasses two related, but distinct, 
doctrines: conflict preemption and field preemption.84 Movsesian III 
emphasized that the Supreme Court in American Insurance clarified 
that even in the absence of any express federal policy, a state law may 
still be preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine if it intrudes on the 
field of foreign affairs without addressing a traditional state 
                                                            
80 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067, 
1069–70 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We hold that section 354.4 is preempted and, 
accordingly, reverse the district court’s contrary ruling.”). 
81 See infra Section II.E. 
82 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
83 See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
84 See id. at 419 n.11 (explaining the difference between conflict and field 
preemption: “If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign 
policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, 
field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine, whether the National 
Government had acted and, if it had, without reference to the degree of any 
conflict, the principle having been established that the Constitution entrusts 
foreign policy exclusively to the National Government. See, e.g., Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Where, 
however, a State has acted within what Justice Harlan called its ‘traditional 
competence,’ 389 U.S., at 459, 88 S.Ct. 664, but in a way that affects foreign 
relations, it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or 
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance of 
the state concern asserted. Whether the strength of the federal foreign policy 
interest should itself be weighed is, of course, a further question. Cf. Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947) (congressional occupation of the field is not to be presumed ‘in a field 
which the States have traditionally occupied’); Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–508, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) (‘In an 
area of uniquely federal interest,’ ‘[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be 
as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption’).”). 
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responsibility.85 The Movsesian III Court then created a new two-
pronged framework regarding field preemption analysis: (1) does the 
statute concern a traditional area of state responsibility; and (2) if it 
does not, then does the statute intrude on the Federal Government’s 
foreign affairs power.86 While loosely based on the Supreme Court 
holding in Garamendi, this is a totally new and expansive approach to 
field preemption.87 
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio state 
probate law that provided for escheatment unless the nonresident alien 
could demonstrate that the foreign country from which the alien came 
granted various reciprocal rights to United States citizens.88 The Court 
recognized that even without any express federal treaty, statute, 
agreement, or executive order, this statute still infringed upon the 
Executive’s foreign affairs power.89 The statute effectively created a 
state foreign affairs policy and was therefore impermissible.90 
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court noted how in applying this 
probate law, the state courts were launching inquiries into foreign 
states and their systems of governance.91 It emphasized this thought 
further, stating “[a]s one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that 
foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the ‘cold war,’ and 
the like are the real desiderata.”92 These matters, of course, are 
properly within the realm of the Federal Government and so the state 
statute, while not expressly preempted by federal law, was 
nevertheless preempted under field preemption.93 
                                                            
85 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1072. 
86 Id. at 1074. 
87 See id. at 1074 (setting forth the two-prong analysis “as Garamendi suggests”). 
88 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430–31 (1968). The Oregon statute in 
question “provides for escheat in cases where a nonresident alien claims real or 
personal property unless three requirements are satisfied: 
 (1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take property 
on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country; (2) the right 
of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds from estates in the 
foreign country; and (3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of 
Oregon estates ‘without confiscation.’” Id. 
89 See id. at 432. 
90 See id. 
91 See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
92 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437. 
93 See id. at 441 (explaining how the “Oregon law is not as gross an intrusion in 
the federal domain as those others might be. Yet . . . it has a direct impact upon 
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Garamendi further clarified this concept of field preemption. The 
Supreme Court in Garamendi held unconstitutional a California state 
statute, the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (“HVIRA”), which 
required any insurance company doing business in California to 
disclose information regarding its policies sold in Europe between 
1920 and 1945.94 HVIRA was expressly preempted by multiple 
executive agreements, which the Court, relying on Zschernig, held to 
have preemptive power, especially in instances of clear conflict.95 
The Movsesian III Court focused, admittedly, on the dicta and a 
footnote of the Garamendi holding.96 In footnote eleven of 
Garamendi, the Supreme Court noted that conflict and field 
preemption may in fact be complementary if a “state were to take a 
position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to 
addressing a traditional state responsibility.”97 The Movsesian III 
Court further noted how “[t]he Garamendi Court in dicta rejected the 
‘traditional state interests’ advanced by California in support of 
HVIRA, finding instead that the real purpose of the state law was the 
‘concern for the several thousand Holocaust survivors said to be living 
in the state.’”98 The court made this determination even though the 
state posited that the statute attempted to regulate property, a 
traditional state interest.99 
Building on Garamendi and Zschernig, the court in Movsesian III 
enunciated a new framework of field preemption. Specifically, it 
explained that field preemption, while rare, is appropriate when the 
state is without a real claim addressing a traditional state interest, and 
it intrudes on a clear matter of foreign policy.100 As for the first prong, 
the court held that, while regulating insurance is a traditional state 
interest, § 354.4 is clearly trying to provide a friendly forum for 
                                                                                                                                            
foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central 
government to deal with those problems.”). 
94 See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
95 Id. at 397. 
96 See infra note 97. 
97 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.11. 
98 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067, 
1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). 
99 Id. 
100 See id. (applying this new framework for field preemption as “Garamendi 
suggests”). However, this Article explains why Garamendi is poor support for 
this new test. 
252 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 234 
monetary relief for Armenian Genocide victims.101 As for the second 
prong, the court relied on Zschernig to support its contention that since 
§ 354.4 “expresses a distinct political point of view on a specific 
matter of foreign policy,” it is preempted.102 Moreover, the distinct 
political point of view in Movsesian III was that California imposed 
the politically charged term “genocide” into its legislation.103 The 
court further explained that in applying § 354.4 “[c]ourts . . . may . . . 
have to decide whether the policyholder ‘escaped to avoid 
persecution,’ (citations omitted) which in turn would require a highly-
politicized inquiry into the conduct of a foreign nation.”104 The court 
also noted how Turkey remains very committed to preventing the 
Armenian Genocide from being formally acknowledged as such, and 
so this remains a hotly contested foreign affairs issue.105 Therefore, 
§ 354.4 unconstitutionally infringed on the executive’s powers to 
conduct foreign affairs unimpeded by the states.106 
E. Movsesian I vs. Movsesian III 
The Movsesian I holding seems to be a simple application of 
conflict preemption, including peripherally weighing the federal and 
state interests at the conclusion of the decision. In this regard, 
Movsesian I mirrors the Garamendi holding almost step for step. In a 
nutshell, such a holding looks for (1) express federal policy, which 
may include an incredible amount of even informal executive 
communication, and (2) a state statute that is clearly conflicting. While 
this is technically enough grounds for finding preemption, (3) the court 
will then balance the federal interest as compared to how generally 
applicable the state law is and how much it relates to a traditional state 
interest.107  
Finding the expression of clear federal policy was the major issue 
for the court in Movsesian I. While Garamendi relied upon multiple 
executive agreements to resolve American citizens’ claims against a 
                                                            
101 See id. at 1076 (“Thus, it is clear that the real purpose of section 354.4 is to 
provide potential monetary relief and a friendly forum for those who suffered 




105 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
106 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077. 
107 See supra Section II.B. 
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foreign country, Movsesian I relied on three informal letters from the 
President and members of the President’s Cabinet to create federal 
law.108 The dissent in Movsesian I as well as the majority in Movsesian 
II simply showed that such informal communications have never been 
given preemptive effect.109 Additionally, there were numerous 
informal communications pushing for a legislative recognition of the 
Armenian Genocide that easily counterbalanced any federal 
expressions to the contrary.110 
In endeavoring to fix the obvious hole in Movsesian I, the 
Movsesian III Court decided that there was no need to find an express 
federal policy against legislative recognition of the Armenian 
Genocide and instead substantially widened the boundaries of the 
seldom-used doctrine of field preemption.111 Instead of relying on the 
principal holding of Garamendi, which is rooted in conflict 
preemption, the court in Movsesian III grasped at the dicta and 
footnotes relating to Garamendi’s understanding of Zschernig, an 
older field preemption case.112 
The Movsesian III Court used Garamendi to show that § 354.4 was 
not legislating a traditional state interest.113 The Movsesian III Court 
also used Zschernig to show that § 354.4 intruded on the Federal 
Government’s foreign affairs powers.114 As this Article will explore in 
the following section, these cases simply do not support the 
contentions for which the Movsesian III Court used them. There are 
very clear distinctions and, furthermore, this broad understanding of 
field preemption has been severely called into question by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Medellin.115 
                                                            
108 See id. 
109 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian II) 629 F.3d 901, 906 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Munich Re argues that these communications are sufficient to 
constitute an express federal policy. They are not. The three cited executive 
branch communications arguing against recognition of the Armenian Genocide 
are counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by various statements from the federal 
executive and legislative branches in favor of such recognition.”). 
110 Id. 
111 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3dat 1075 (explaining how “[f]ield preemption is a 
rarely invoked doctrine”). 
112 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text 
113 See supra note 101. 
114 See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. 
115 See infra Section III.B. 
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III.  MOVSESIAN III ISSUES: AN UTTER LACK OF PRECEDENT 
There are two principal issues with the Movsesian III holding, both 
of which have been expressed and explored in numerous scholarly 
articles. Therefore, this Article will only briefly expound on them. The 
first problem is that after taking an even superficial look at Garamendi 
and Zschernig, it is clear that they are very clearly distinguishable 
from the facts in Movsesian.116 Even the few selected facts that were 
included in the Movsesian III opinion have glaring and critical 
differences from those cases. Secondly, the basic holding in Movsesian 
III relies on Zschernig, which is further explained by Garamendi. 
However, more recent Supreme Court cases have greatly reduced such 
wide application of field preemption. Many scholars believe that 
Medellin117 limits foreign affairs field preemption strictly to “executive 
agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and 
foreign governments.”118 This Section will briefly explain these two 
issues. 
A. Zschernig and Garamendi Are Easily Distinguishable 
The three authors of “Stoney Road Out of Eden: The Struggle to 
Recover Insurance for Armenian Genocide Deaths and Its Implications 
for the Future of State Authority, Contract Rights, and Human Rights,” 
strongly criticize the Movsesian III holding.119 While they discuss how 
the cited cases in Movsesian III are distinguishable from it, the 
principal focus of their criticism is in the Ninth Circuit’s extreme 
widening of federal preemption.120 This Section will show that from a 
pure stare decisis viewpoint, the Movsesian III decision is devoid of 
true support.121 
                                                            
116 See generally Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and 
Presidential Policies, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19 (2010) 
(distinguishing the facts of Zschernig and Garamendi from those of Movsesian 
and further explaining how "Movsesian’s result is . . . inconsistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín.”). Id. at 20. 
117 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); see also infra note 143 (explaining 
the basic facts and holding in Medellin). 
118 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491. 
119 See generally Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7. 
120 See id. 
121 See infra Section III.A. This Article focuses primarily on Supreme Court 
precedent, thus, the two Ninth Circuit cases on which the Movsesian III Court 
relies will not be examined here. 
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1. Garamendi 
As noted above, the Movsesian III Court used Garamendi to 
support the first prong of the field preemption analysis, which is that 
§ 354.4 “does not concern an area of traditional state responsibility.”122 
The court relied on the legislative history of § 354.4 to conclude that, 
although technically a regulation on insurance, the principal aim of the 
statute was to provide potential monetary relief and a friendly forum 
for Armenian Genocide victims.123 
However, Garamendi is simply not a field preemption case at all. 
Rather, it established the widening application of conflict 
preemption.124 Garamendi stands for the contention that executive 
expression on foreign affairs carrying the gravity of preemption can 
develop even through informal communications.125 Moreover, 
Garamendi is a case where executive agreements created a pre-
emptible executive foreign policy.126 While the Garamendi majority in 
dicta and a footnote used language that could be instructive for a field 
preemption analysis, Garamendi is not binding precedent for the 
Movsesian III holding, which is clearly rooted in field preemption.127 
Interestingly, the Movsesian III Court holding is slightly confusing 
as to how much importance it gave to Garamendi as support. The 
court itself noted that the support from Garamendi was not binding.128 
However, once the court reached the application of the holding there 
were no limiting words on the Garamendi ruling as a non-binding 
precedent. The court simply wrote: 
This is precisely the same purpose underlying HVIRA, 
the statute held unconstitutional in Garamendi, 
                                                            
122 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067, 
1076 (9th Cir. 2012); see also supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
124 See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 60. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. This is precisely how the Movsesian I Court used Garamendi, albeit, in an 
overly broad fashion. 
127 See id. at 71 n.296 (explaining that Garamendi is a “conflict” preemption case 
and Movsesian is a “field” preemption case and thus, Garamendi is far from 
binding authority mandating the Movsesian holding.). 
128 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067, 
1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (focusing on Van Saher, another Ninth Circuit case, and 
how the proposed field preemption test supposedly extrapolated from 
Garamendi should be used). 
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and section 354.3, the state law held preempted in Von 
Saher. As Garamendi and Von Saher make clear, that 
goal, however laudable it may be, “is not an area of 
‘traditional state responsibility,’ and the statute is 
therefore subject to a field preemption analysis.” Von 
Saher, 592 F.3d at 965; see also Garamendi (noting the 
weakness of the state’s interest in vindicating the 
insurance claims of Holocaust survivors). In 
sum, section 354.4 does not concern an area of 
traditional state responsibility.129 
Ultimately, it seems that the court was appropriately relying more 
on Van Saher130 for its field preemption implications than on 
Garamendi.131 However, the entire buildup to this analysis seemed to 
give much more weight to Garamendi, but then suddenly the court 
utilized as precedent the holdings of the Ninth Circuit, rather than 
those of the Supreme Court. The lack of clear Supreme Court 
precedent undoubtedly weakens the Movsesian III holding. 
2. Zschernig 
The Movsesian III Court uses Zschernig to support the second 
prong of its field preemption analysis, which is that “§ 354.4 intrudes 
on the Federal Government’s foreign affairs power.”132 As explained 
above, the court made two points: (1) § 354.4 expresses a distinct 
political view by using the words “Armenian Genocide”; and (2) 
because courts applying § 354.4 must decide if the plaintiff “escaped 
to avoid persecution,” thus requiring courts to make a highly-
politicized inquiry into the conduct of a foreign nation.133 
Zschernig is distinguishable and therefore clearly not binding 
precedent for either of the court’s two contentions in Movsesian III.134 
In Zschernig, the Supreme Court analyzed many different cases 
                                                            
129 Id. at 1076. 
130 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 
131 See discussion supra Section III.A.1. 
132 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1076; see also supra note 102 and accompanying 
text. 
133 See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text. 
134 See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
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involving the application of the Oregon reciprocal intestacy statute.135 
The Court noted that: 
In short, it would seem that Oregon judges in 
construing § 111.070 seek to ascertain whether 
“rights” protected by foreign law are the same 
“rights” that citizens of Oregon enjoy. If, as in the 
Rogers case, the alleged foreign “right” may be 
vindicated only through Communist-controlled state 
agencies, then there is no “right” of the 
type § 111.070 requires. The same seems to be true if 
enforcement may require approval of a Fascist dictator, 
as in Krachler. The statute as construed seems to make 
unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on 
a more authoritarian basis than our own.136 
After this robust inspection into how the Oregon courts were 
construing the statute to make judgments about foreign countries, the 
Court held the statute preempted due to its potential frustration of 
United States federal foreign policy.137 
Section 354.4 clearly does not require such an intrusive inquiry, 
nor are there any California cases that the Supreme Court can point to 
showing that § 354.4 would force such an inquiry. All that a California 
court must determine is whether the potential plaintiff fled her country 
to avoid persecution.138 This determination is far from a highly-
politicized inquiry into the functions of an existing government and 
making judgments as to its democratic value. As it relates to the 
Turkish government, both current and past, the analysis involves 
absolutely no such judgment at all.139 The application of the statute 
would be purely a factual determination relating to the plaintiff and her 
personal motives for fleeing. 
                                                            
135 See id. at 430-31. (“[The statute] provide[d] for escheat in cases where a 
nonresident alien claims real or personal property unless three requirements are 
satisfied: (1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take 
property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country; (2) 
the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds from estates 
in the foreign country; and (3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the 
proceeds of Oregon estates ‘without confiscation.’”). 
136 Id. at 440. 
137 Id. at 441. 
138 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2011) 
139 See Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 7, at 71 n.296. 
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The issue in Zschernig was not the expression of a distinct political 
viewpoint as the Movsesian III Court would like to intimate.140 The 
issue lay in how the Oregon courts were applying the statute and the 
value-laden judgments those courts were making on then-existing 
foreign governments, on the court record.141 The court in Movsesian 
III focused on the dicta in Zschernig without applying its actual 
holding. 
B. Medellin as a Limiter 
The second issue with Movsesian III is that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Medellin seems to severely cut back on the applicability of 
field preemption.142 Interestingly, Movsesian I briefly distinguished 
Medellin143 as applicable only in the realm of criminal law.144 
However, Movsesian III completely failed to even mention Medellin, 
let alone distinguish it.145 This issue is noted and discussed in an 
                                                            
140 See id. A valid argument can also be made that § 354.4 is not expressing a 
distinct political point by using the words “Armenian Genocide” as because the 
facts speak for themselves and the executive has made multiple statements 
regarding the Genocide just not in those words. 
141 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433-34. 
142 See A. Mark Weisburd, Medellin, the President’s Foreign Affairs Power and 
Domestic Law, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 595, 625-27 (2010). 
143 See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). Briefly stated, the facts 
of Medellin are as follows. The United States entered a treaty in which any 
international citizen arrested in the US be given the chance to contact that 
person’s embassy or consulate. José Medellín, a Mexican national arrested, 
convicted and sentenced to death for a horrific double murder in Houston. After 
conviction and sentencing, Medellín objected that Texas had failed to inform 
him of his rights under the treaty. The Texas court denied relief on grounds that 
it was too late. After the United States rejected Mexico’s diplomatic overtures, 
Mexico filed suit against the United States in the ICJ. The ICJ ruled that the case 
be reexamined. Then President George W. Bush issued a memorandum directing 
that state courts comply with the ICJ ruling of the treaty: Texas refused. The 
case proceeded to the Supreme Court on two issues; (1) statute of limitations; 
and (2) did the ICJ decision or the President’s Memorandum supersede Texas 
state law. See id. 
144 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052, 
1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In prior cases where the presidential policy at issue 
implicated criminal law (an area traditionally left to the states to regulate), or 
foreign commerce (an area delegated by the Constitution to Congress), the Court 
has refused to accord the policy preemptive effect.”). 
145 See generally Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Stempel, Armenian & McClure, supra note 
7, at 75-76. 
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article by Professor Michael D. Ramsey.146 While Professor Ramsey’s 
criticism is on the Movsesian I decision, it is obviously applicable to 
the Movsesian III holding as well. 
While much of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Medellin relates 
to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ruling and the non-self-
executing nature of treaties, the plain language of Medellin clearly 
limits the wide application of field preemption.147 The United States 
argued, with support presumably from Garamendi, that Texas law 
must give way to the express executive foreign policy that was 
expressed in the President’s memorandum.148 The Court limited 
Garamendi to its facts and explained that “[t]he claims-settlement 
cases involve a narrow set of circumstances: the making of executive 
agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and 
foreign governments or foreign nationals.”149 This language clearly 
limits the applicability of Garamendi. 
While Professor Ramsey’s criticism is true regarding Movsesian I, 
one could argue that because Movsesian III is rooted in field 
preemption and not conflict preemption, Medellin has no applicability 
at all. However, this is clearly not the case. Movsesian III’s entire 
support comes from dicta in Garamendi (and Zschernig) and if the 
principal holding has been so limited, then what validity could such 
dicta carry? 
The First Circuit, while expressing no opinion as to whether 
Medellin is a limiter or not, succinctly summarized the different 
opinions then in existence as follows: 
We recognize that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 
L.Ed.2d 190 (2008), may have cast doubt on the 
continuing vitality of Garamendi. See, e.g., A. Mark 
Weisburd, Medellín, the President’s Foreign Affairs 
Power and Domestic Law, 28 Penn St. Int’l L.Rev. 595, 
625 (2010) (“One fairly clear consequence 
of Medellín is that the very broad language used 
in American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi no longer carries 
weight.” (footnote omitted)). But see In re 
Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 119 n. 2 
                                                            
146 See Ramsey, supra note 116, at 19. 
147 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497-98, 525. 
148 Id. at 495. 
149 Id. 
260 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 234 
(2d Cir.2010) (concluding that Medellín is consistent 
with a broad understanding 
of Garamendi)150; Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung 
AG, 578 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 
2009) (acknowledging Medellín151 but nonetheless 
applying Garamendi broadly). We express no opinion 
on that issue.152 
Despite the First Circuit refraining from expressing any opinion on the 
matter, there is much criticism and doubt regarding the continued 
viability of Garamendi. 
IV. FINDING A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND FINDING A FRIENDLY FORUM 
Even if Medellin is not a limiter, Garamendi simply may not mean 
what the Ninth Circuit assumes it means. Garamendi may simply be a 
widened application of federal express conflict preemption and not 
field preemption.153 This Section will demonstrate that there are other 
cases where the Supreme Court showed its willingness to limit 
                                                            
150 Interestingly, the exact words of the Second Circuit in In re Assicurazioni 
Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 119 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) are as follows: (“We find 
nothing inconsistent with this position in the reference in Medellin v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008), to ‘cases in which [the 
Supreme Court] has upheld the authority of the President to settle foreign claims 
pursuant to an executive agreement.’ Id. at 1371.”). 
 So, while in Generali, where the plaintiffs sought the benefits of life insurance 
policies bought by Holocaust victims from an Italian company, the Court easily 
found Garamendi to be applicable, to the point that Medellin has supplanted or 
limited Garamendi it had no effect on the Generali holding simply because even 
per Medellin the executive has preemptive power with regards to settling claims 
against foreign governments or foreign nationals, which was the case in 
Generali since the Court found that “such law suits (suits against foreign 
insurance companies for the benefits of Holocaust victims’ insurance policies) 
are directly in conflict with the Government’s policy that claims should be 
resolved exclusively through the ICHEIC.” Therefore, the First Circuit’s 
barebones assertion that the Second Circuit has not found Medellin to be 
limiting Garamendi is not strictly true. 
151 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian I) 578 F.3d 1052, 1059 
(9th Cir. 2009) (referring to Movsesian I as Movsesian III did not make mention 
of Medellin at all). 
152 See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 12 n.12 (1st 
Cir. 2010). 
153 See discussion supra Section III.A.1. 
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Garamendi.154 Additionally, this Section will attempt to show that 
there currently seems to be a circuit court split as to how far reaching 
field preemption is considering Garamendi, irrespective of Medellin as 
a limiter. This circuit split could have a substantial impact on future 
litigation in the areas of field and conflict preemption, as well as act as 
a guide for groups seeking newly enacted state legislation that could 
possibly implicate a foreign policy.155 
In Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,156 the Supreme Court once 
again used extremely limiting language in its characterization of 
Garamendi. In Whiting, an Arizona state law providing “that the 
licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ 
unauthorized aliens may be, and in certain circumstances must be, 
suspended or revoked,” was challenged under express and implied 
federal preemption.157 The government posited that the Arizona law 
was impliedly preempted by a federal statute.158 The government 
relied heavily on the Garamendi holding regarding implied 
preemption.159 
The Court easily disregarded Garamendi as precedent for implied 
preemption in this instance through two short arguments. First, the 
Court explained how “[a]s an initial matter, the cases on which the 
Chamber relies in advancing this argument all involve uniquely federal 
areas of regulation. See American Ins Assn. v. Garamendi . . . 
                                                            
154 See infra text accompanying notes 153-59. 
155 See Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are Out There—and the Court Should 
Resolve Them, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Aug. 13, 
2015), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-circuit-splits-are-out-
there-and-the-court-should-resolve-them [http://perma.cc/W4VC-44K3] 
(explaining how circuit splits are generally a reason for the Supreme Court to 
grant certiorari). 
156 See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 563 U.S. 582 (2011). 
157 Id. at 587. 
158 See id. at 588-89. (“The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) makes it 
‘unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, 
for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an 
unauthorized alien.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A).Employers that violate that 
prohibition may be subjected to federal civil and criminal sanctions. IRCA also 
restricts the ability of States to combat employment of unauthorized workers; 
the Act expressly preempts ‘any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who 
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized 
aliens.’ § 1324a(h)(2).”). 
159 Id. at 604. 
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(presidential conduct of foreign policy).”160 Second, the Court 
explained that “In Garamendi, a state law imposing sanctions on 
insurance companies directly ‘thwart[ed] the [Federal] Government’s 
policy of repose’ for insurance companies that participated in an 
international program negotiated by the President.”161 This very 
narrow interpretation of Garamendi harmonized with the Supreme 
Court’s general trend toward limiting the implications of the 
Garamendi holding.162 
A. Circuit Split 
Garamendi represents the first time since Zschernig that the 
Supreme Court weighed in on the application of federal field 
preemption.163 Garamendi itself recognized that Zschernig left 
unanswered questions, but opted to circumvent these issues and focus 
instead on express conflict preemption.164 Consequently, while 
Garamendi carries definite implications for a field preemption 
analysis, it is not a pure field preemption case.165 Furthermore, to the 
extent that Garamendi widens federal preemption, it seems likely to 
have been limited by Medellin and possibly Whiting.166 
However, the Ninth Circuit clearly understood Garamendi to have 
serious field preemption overtones and implications given that it 
applied a field preemption test to Movsesian III as “Garamendi 
suggests.”167 The Fifth168 and Second169 Circuits seem to have adopted 
                                                            
160 Id. (citation omitted). 
161 Id. 
162 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
163 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, (Movsesian III) 670 F.3d 1067, 
1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining how “[m]ore than three decades later [after the 
Zschernig decision], in Garamendi, the Supreme Court clarified when the 
application of the field preemption doctrine might be appropriate.”). 
164 See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419–20 (2003) (“It is a fair question 
whether respect for the executive foreign relations power requires a categorical 
choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident 
in the Zschernig opinions, but the question requires no answer here.”). 
165 See id. (explaining that “we think petitioners and the Government have 
demonstrated a sufficiently clear conflict to require finding preemption here”) 
The clear conflict resulted from three international agreements which the United 
States was party to. 
166 See discussion supra Section III.B; see also supra text accompanying notes 153-
59. 
167 See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1074. 
168 See generally Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz, 615 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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a similar interpretation of Garamendi. By contrast, the First Circuit 
understood Garamendi as pertaining to express conflict preemption.170 
Similarly, the Third Circuit has discussed Garamendi in a very limited 
fashion.171 
With so many of the federal appellate courts weighing in and so 
many of them applying their understanding of Garamendi in different 
ways, this issue of federal field preemption is ripe for a Supreme Court 
ruling. Even assuming this split is not clear enough to require Supreme 
Court review, this Article provides a roadmap for jurisdictions with a 
more tempered view of field preemption, thereby providing a friendlier 
forum for Armenian litigants and future similarly situated litigants. 
B. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit seems to understand Garamendi as a field 
preemption case, as evidenced in Dunbar v. Seger-Thomschitz,172 
where the court discussed Garamendi in dicta. In Dunbar, the current 
owner of a valuable painting sued for quiet title under Louisiana’s 
prescription laws (statute of limitations).173 The painting originally 
belonged to Raimund Reichel whose sole heir, Dr. Seger-Thomschitz, 
alleged that the painting was confiscated from Reichel by the Nazis in 
a forced sale.174 The basic facts about the ownership and chain of title 
were undisputed, however, Dunbar simply claimed that true title was 
acquired through acquisitive prescription.175 The District Court granted 
summary judgment to Dunbar.176 
On appeal, Seger-Thomschitz argued that federal common law 
should replace Louisiana’s prescription law and, pertinent to the issue 
at hand, that the “Terezin Declaration”177 should preempt Louisiana 
                                                                                                                                            
169 See generally In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010). 
170 See generally Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2010). 
171 See generally Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
172 See generally Dunbar, 615 F.3d 574. 
173 See id. at 575. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 576. 
177 See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 
2010) (explaining that, “The parties to the Declaration stated, in relevant part: 
[W]e urge all stakeholders to ensure that their legal systems or alternative 
processes, while taking into account the different legal traditions, facilitate just 
264 UMass Law Review v. 13 | 234 
state law.178 The Court initially noted that because this argument was 
initially only brought up on appeal, it would not explore this issue.179 
The court then explained that “[e]ven if we were to consider 
Appellant’s preemption theory, it is untenable.”180 Appellants argued 
that “[t]he policy represented by the Terezin Declaration should 
preempt Louisiana prescription periods because it expresses a 
preference to adjudicate claims for recovery of Nazi-confiscated 
artworks on their facts and merits.”181 
Seger-Thomschitz principally relied on Garamendi as support that 
a federal policy evidenced in executive agreements and treaties can 
have preemptive effect against state law.182 The court easily 
distinguished Garamendi, stating that: 
California was essentially pursuing independent policy 
objectives in favor of Holocaust victims. The existence 
of its law limited the President’s ability to exercise his 
preeminent foreign affairs authority. In this case, 
Louisiana has not pursued any policy specific to 
Holocaust victims or Nazi-confiscated artwork. The 
state’s prescription periods apply generally to any 
challenge of ownership to movable property, and are 
well within the realm of traditional state 
responsibility.183 
The court’s characterization of Garamendi is a clear indicator that the 
Fifth Circuit understood Garamendi as a field preemption case. In 
explaining the Garamendi holding, the court wrote: 
                                                                                                                                            
and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated and looted art, and to make 
certain that claims to recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on 
the facts and merits of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all 
parties. Governments should consider all relevant issues when applying various 
legal provisions that may impede the restitution of art and cultural property, in 
order to achieve just and fair solutions, as well as alternative dispute resolution, 
where appropriate under law.”). 
178 See Dunbar, 615 F.3d at 577. 
179 See id. 
180 Id. at 578. 
181 See id. at 578-79 (“As additional support, Appellant cites statements by various 
executive branch officials expressing concern that such claims were not being 
adjudicated on the merits but were barred by statutes of limitations and other 
defenses.”). 
182 Id. at 578. 
183 Id. at 579. 
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Significantly, Garamendi found preemption while 
acknowledging the absence of either an express federal 
preemption clause or a direct conflict between 
California and federal law. Garamendi noted, however, 
that where a state has acted within “its traditional 
competence, but in a way that affects foreign relations, 
it might make good sense to require a conflict, of a 
clarity or substantiality that would vary with the 
strength or traditional importance of the state concern 
asserted.”184 
If the court understood Garamendi to be an express conflict 
preemption case, as this Article proposes, it might have simply 
distinguished Garamendi because there is no express federal policy 
expressed in Dunbar. The Fifth Circuit clearly understands Garamendi 
as the Ninth Circuit did: as a field preemption case where the state 
ventured beyond its “traditional competence.”185 
C. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit in In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A.,186 also 
seemed to apply Garamendi as a field preemption case, however, it is 
not perfectly clear on this point.187 Generali involved a direct 
application of Garamendi and as such the facts are not as critical to 
this analysis.. Briefly stated, plaintiffs were beneficiaries of insurance 
policies sold by Generali, an Italian insurance company, to Holocaust 
victims during the years of 1920-1942.188 Many similar lawsuits, 
originating in different circuits, were consolidated and transferred to 
the Southern District of New York.189 Relying on the Garamendi 
ruling, which came down from the Supreme Court in 2003, the District 
Court dismissed all these actions the following year.190 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit found Garamendi to be controlling precedent and 
upheld the District Court’s dismissal.191 According to the court, the 
                                                            
184 Id. at 578 (citations omitted). 
185 Id. 
186 See generally In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010). 
187 See infra text accompanying notes 192-95. 
188 See Generali, 592 F.3d at 115-18 (regarding the background and procedural 
history). 
189 Id. at 116. 
190 Id. at 117. 
191 Id. at 120. 
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claims against Generali were precisely the kinds of claims that the 
United States government previously had agreed with Germany to be 
handled by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance 
Claims (“ICHEIC”).192 In Garamendi, the California law merely 
mandated disclosure requirements on insurance companies regarding 
all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.193 But “although 
not directly in conflict with government’s policy to encourage use of 
the ICHEIC to resolve Holocaust-era insurance claims, [the California 
law] nonetheless undermined the Government’s objective” and was 
therefore preempted.194 In contrast, Generali was a direct lawsuit 
against an insurance company for benefits owed due to actions 
occurring during World War II.195 The court explained that “such law 
suits are directly in conflict with the Government’s policy that claims 
should be resolved exclusively through the ICHEIC.”196 
The court in Generali characterized Garamendi first as a conflict 
preemption case, but then, in answering the plaintiffs’ attempts to 
                                                            
192 See id. at 116 (providing a brief history and overview of the facts leading up to 
both the Garamendi and Generali litigation: “In July 2000, the United States 
announced an agreement with Germany in which the German government 
agreed to enact legislation to establish a foundation that would be used to 
compensate all victims who suffered at the hands of German companies during 
the Nazi era. In return, the United States agreed that whenever a German 
company was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in an American (state or federal) 
court, the government of the United States would submit a statement of interest 
to the court explaining that ‘it would be in the foreign policy interests of the 
United States for the [German] Foundation to be the exclusive forum and 
remedy for the resolution of all asserted claims against German companies 
arising from their involvement in the National Socialist era and World War II . . 
. . With respect to insurance claims, the agreement specified that the German 
foundation would work with the ICHEIC to handle insurance claims. The 
ICHEIC was formed in 1998 by ‘several European insurance companies, the 
State of Israel, Jewish and Holocaust survivor associations, and the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners,’ to negotiate with European insurers 
to provide information about unpaid policies issued to Holocaust victims 
between 1920 and 1945, and to settle any claims that arose in the Holocaust era 
under these policies.”) (citations omitted). 
193 See Am. Ins.v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003) (“[a]mong other laws, 
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA) requires 
any insurer doing business in the State to disclose information about all policies 
sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by the company or any one “related” to 
it upon penalty of loss of its state business license.”). 
194 See Generali, 592 F.3d at 118. 
195 Id. at 113. 
196 Id. at 118. 
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distinguish Generali from Garamendi, seemed to consider Garamendi 
to be a field preemption case. In introducing Garamendi, the Court 
wrote that “[i]n Garamendi, the Supreme Court explained that state 
law ‘must give way’ to the foreign policy of the United States, as set 
by the President, where there is ‘evidence of clear conflict between the 
policies adopted by the two.’”197 These words evidence an 
understanding that Garamendi is rooted in conflict preemption. 
The court demonstrated that while Generali is distinguishable from 
Garamendi in that there was no executive agreement between the 
United States and Italy, this argument is unconvincing.198 Specifically, 
the court stated: 
The Court in Garamendi . . . did not find that the 
United States policy of encouraging resolution of 
Holocaust-era insurance claims through the ICHEIC 
depended on the existence of executive agreements. 
Rather, the Court viewed the executive agreements as 
the product of the policy. The agreements, and 
statements of interest issued by the Government 
pursuant to them, illustrate or express the national 
position, rather than define it.199 
The Second Circuit understood that express conflict preemption comes 
about due to the “executive policy.”200 In Garamendi, the executive 
policy was evidenced, in part, by an executive agreement.201 However, 
                                                            
197 See id. (“[the Garamendi] Court concluded that the ‘consistent Presidential 
foreign policy has been to encourage European governments and companies to 
volunteer settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions,’ and, 
in the insurance context specifically, ‘to encourage European insurers to work 
with the ICHEIC to develop acceptable claim procedures.’”). 
198 Id. at 118. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 See Am. Ins. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (explaining that there was 
clear conflict between the Federal position and that of California: “The exercise 
of the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where, as 
here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two. 
The foregoing account of negotiations toward the three settlement agreements is 
enough to illustrate that the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to 
encourage European governments and companies to volunteer settlement funds 
in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions . . . . As for insurance claims in 
particular, the national position, expressed unmistakably in the executive 
agreements signed by the President with Germany and Austria, has been to 
encourage European insurers to work with the ICHEIC to develop acceptable 
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the court in Generali was clearly open to the idea that the federal 
expression of executive policy may come about in other ways and still 
have preemptive effect. This is the precise reasoning that was applied 
by in Movsesian I.202 Thus, while the Second Circuit clearly applied 
Garamendi to Generali in a conflict preemption fashion, the Generali 
holding is mostly consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s Movsesian I. 
D. First Circuit 
The First Circuit decision in Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. 
Seger-Thomschitz203 has already been discussed in this Article for its 
contention that some scholars and courts have found Medellin to be a 
limiter of Garamendi.204 This Section will focus on the Museum of 
Fine Arts principal holding on foreign affairs preemption. The First 
Circuit seems to have clearly understood Garamendi as conflict 
preemption case. Consequently, the First Circuit would very likely 
come up with a different outcome than the Movsesian III Court if 
presented with similar facts. 
Interestingly, Museum of Fine Arts involves nearly identical facts 
to the Dunbar case, as discussed above.205 In Museum of Fine Arts, 
Claudia Seger-Thomschitz, the same plaintiff as in Dunbar, sought to 
regain possession of a different valuable painting from the Museum of 
Fine Arts in Boston, under the same theory that her ancestor had been 
forced to sell the painting in dispute.206 Eventually, the Museum of 
Fine Arts sued for quiet title and the District Court granted the 
museum summary judgment on the grounds of statute of limitations.207 
On appeal, there was the narrow issue of whether the plaintiff’s 
claim was time-barred.208 The court held that the claims were time-
barred, federal common law did not apply, and that there was no 
                                                                                                                                            
claim procedures, including procedures governing disclosure of policy 
information.”). 
202 See discussion supra Section II.B. The Movsesian I Court greatly expanded 
which federal expressions can have preemptive effect on state laws – there, it 
was the mere act of the executive sending disapproving letters to Congress. 
203 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). 
204 Supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. 
205 Compare Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 623 F.3d 1, with Dunbar v. Seger-
Thomschitz, 615 F.3d (5th Cir. 2010). 
206 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 623 F.3d at 2. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 6. 
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foreign affairs preemption.209 Notably, in this proceeding, Seger-
Thomschitz brought up the issue of foreign affairs preemption in her 
opening brief and the First Circuit ruled definitively on this issue, 
unlike in Dunbar, where the ruling on the foreign affairs issue was 
essentially dicta.210 Seger-Thomschitz argued that the Massachusetts 
statute of limitation laws as applied to the case conflicted with the 
Federal Government’s foreign policy.211 She relied on several 
international declarations signed by the Executive Branch, among 
them the Terezin Declaration.212 Plaintiff argued that these 
declarations evidenced a federal policy “disfavoring the application of 
rigid limitations periods to claims for Nazi-looted art.”213 
As in Dunbar, Seger-Thomschitz attempted to use Garamendi as 
support for her claim.214 The court first characterized Garamendi as a 
case where “[t]he Supreme Court held . . . that ‘state law must give 
way’ when it is in ‘clear conflict’ with an ‘express federal policy’ in 
the foreign affairs context.”215 The court then easily defeated this point 
by distinguishing Garamendi on two points, including that “First, there 
is no comparably express federal policy bearing on the issues in this 
case. Second, even if there were such a policy, the Massachusetts 
statute of limitations would not be in clear conflict with it.”216 
Both in the court’s introduction and its application of Garamendi, 
the First Circuit plainly understood Garamendi as nothing more than a 
                                                            
209 Id. at 6-13. 
210 See id. at 11 n.11 (“The MFA contends that Seger–Thomschitz’s foreign affairs 
preemption argument is forfeited because it was raised for the first time in her 
reply brief. That is not correct. Seger–Thomschitz specifically argued for foreign 
affairs preemption in her opening brief. She then developed that argument 
further in her reply brief. There was no forfeiture.”). 
211 Id. at 9-14. 
212 Id. at 12. 
213 Id at 11. 
214 Id. at 11-12. 
215 See id. The court also explains that, “The [Supreme] Court held that the ‘clear 
conflict’ between the state statute and an “express federal policy” was sufficient 
to justify preemption. Id. It added: If any doubt about the clarity of the conflict 
remained, however, it would have to be resolved in the National Government’s 
favor, given the weakness of the State’s interest, against the backdrop of 
traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European 
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA.”) Id. at 12 (citations 
omitted). 
216 Id. 
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wide application of express conflict preemption.217 In Museum of Fine 
Arts, the First Circuit did not find any express federal policy even 
though there were two declarations, a treaty and an executive 
agreement, and both evinced the idea that technicalities of the law 
should not govern looted property claims218 Accordingly, if the First 
Circuit were to rule on the facts of Movsesian, it is likely that it would 
not find conflict preemption as there is even less evidence in 
Movsesian as to any express federal policy. Furthermore, the logic of 
the court in Movsesian III would be unavailing for the First Circuit, as 
it clearly understood Garamendi to be rooted in conflict preemption 
and not field preemption.219 
E. Third Circuit 
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Gross v. German Found. Indus. 
Initiative220 applied Garamendi in a most limited manner and seriously 
confined the breadth of field preemption to areas of law and instances 
where the federal government has adopted a clear and express 
policy.221 This is in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Movsesian III, where the California insurance law was preempted 
merely because the state failed to address its clear traditional state 
interest, and thus intruded on a matter of foreign affairs.222 While 
Gross is preeminently a case about justiciability, there are clear 
implications as to how the Third Circuit understood and applied 
Garamendi.223 In Gross, the dispute centered on how much interest 
                                                            
217 See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
218 See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 623 F.3d at 13 (“None of this language is 
sufficiently clear and definite to constitute evidence of an express federal policy 
against the applicability of state statutes of limitations to claims for the recovery 
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was contemplated in the German government’s newly-created fund.224 
The vast majority of the holding is a detailed analysis of the Baker v. 
Carr225 factors for finding a justiciable conflict. The court in Gross 
ultimately decided that there did exist a justiciable conflict and this 
issue was not a political question.226 The Court reversed and remanded 
to the District Court of New Jersey.227 
Defendants in Gross argued that Garamendi “stands for the 
proposition that the United States Executive has an ‘exclusive role in 
matters relating to the Foundation and Nazi-era claims against German 
nationals.’”228 The Third Circuit limited Garamendi to its facts where 
the executive branch had created a clear policy by addressing the issue 
in question (insurance policies) saying “[t]hese claims [of the 
plaintiff’s in Garamendi] to enforce insurance policies were the claims 
the Foundation was set up to exclusively resolve.”229 This is a clear 
reflection of an understanding that Garamendi is a conflict preemption 
case. 
The Supreme Court in Baker expounded on Garamendi when 
deciding on the first Baker factor: whether there is “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department.”230 The Gross Court explained, citing to 
Garamendi, that “[al]though the Executive’s powers in foreign affairs 
‘do not enjoy any textual detail’ within the Constitution itself, ‘in 
foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to 
act.’”231 However, the court then severely limited this contention to 
instances where the executive has exercised its foreign affairs 
powers.232 
While the Third Circuit’s analysis in Gross of executive foreign 
affairs power is fixed in justiciability, the idea enunciated is applicable 
to foreign affairs preemption as well. The Third Circuit wrote: 
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But it is precisely the breadth of the Executive’s power 
in this field that counsels against our finding that the 
political question doctrine precludes our review. While 
the Executive could constitutionally act to resolve the 
issue of whether “interest” is owed on this “contract” 
or to settle this claim through diplomacy, it has not 
done so. If we were to find that any claim raising an 
issue that the Executive could potentially resolve within 
its constitutional “independent authority to act” in 
foreign affairs to be nonjusticiable, we would risk 
erroneously sweeping “every case or controversy which 
touches foreign relations . . . beyond judicial 
cognizance.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691. The 
mere existence of the Executive’s power to extinguish 
claims made to the Judiciary for redress from foreign 
entities and to resolve certain issues raised in those 
claims, without an exercise of that power, does not 
render those claims nonjusticiable by virtue of being 
committed to a co-equal branch.233 
If the Third Circuit in Gross held as the Ninth Circuit did in Movsesian 
III, then what consequence would exist if these types of disputes are 
justiciable? Once such claims get to court, they will be dismissed 
under field preemption.234 Obviously, the Third Circuit has adopted a 
more tempered understanding of field preemption in general. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Movsesian III potentially 
slammed the doors of American courts in the face of Armenian 
Genocide victims, there remain options for moving forward. The 
model of the Holocaust-era litigation still stands as an example of how 
to hold rogue countries and their corporations accountable for past 
misdeeds. The Turkish refusal to face the reality of its guilt and the 
United States executive’s strategic decision to permit this denial, have 
created an insurmountable obstacle for Armenian litigants. However, 
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the idea of relentless persistence and dogged determination can still be 
gleaned from the Holocaust-era litigation. In fact, as long as Armenian 
survivors refuse to forget, there remains the chance that at some date 
justice will prevail either by Turkey officially recognizing the 
Armenian Genocide or in a legal victory for monetary compensation to 
survivors and their descendants. 
Even if there is never another case brought by an Armenian 
Genocide descendant, this Article still stands as a useful model for 
future analysis. There are unfortunately numerous instances where 
governments go rogue and refuse to acknowledge the facts of history 
and long-lasting impact on survivors. Regrettably, when governments 
neglect their duties of truth to their citizens, many private companies 
take advantage by profiteering. Consequently, many innocent people 
are victimized. The victims of some future genocide or state-sponsored 
seizure may seek redress in the U.S. courts and this Article helps those 
litigants either frame better legislation in friendlier jurisdictions or 
force the Supreme Court to rule on an apparent circuit split. 
